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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID WHYTE, DAVID B. WHYTE,
DAN E. WHYTE, and TERRY WHYTE,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents.
Case No. 14151

vs.

DERL CHRISTENSEN and
MRS. DERL CHRISTENSEN,
Defendants and
Appellants.

APPELLANTS1 BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellants, Deri Christensen and Mrs. Deri Christensen,
appeal from a jury verdict and from a judgment entered upon the verdict
entered therein.
The action involved a claim by respondent, David Whyte, for
labor and materials furnished by him and for the labor of respondents,
David B. Whyte, Dan E. Whyte and Terry Whyte, procured by respondent,
David Whyte, pursuant to an agreement between respondent, David Whyte,
and appellants for construction of an addition to appellants1 home.
In a second cause of action respondents, David B. Whyte, Dan E.
Whyte, and Terry Whyte, claimed to be entitled to recover for labor
supplied by them in the improvement of appellants' home in that appellants
had not required respondent, David Whyte, to furnish a bond to insure
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payment of those furnishing their labor for the improvement of appellants1
property.
Appellants counterclaimed against respondent, David Whyte,
for any amount found to be due laborers or materialmen from appellants,
claiming payment by appellants to respondent, David Whyte, of the full
contract price.
In a second cause of action in the counterclaim, appellants
claimed damages from respondent, David Whyte, for failure to perform
the work done upon appellants1 home in a workmanlike manner.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County before the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, District Court Judge.
From a verdict and a judgment rendered upon the verdict in favor of
respondents (plaintiffs below), the appellants (defendants below) appeal.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellants seek a reversal of the Judgment entered by the
trial court and costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant, Deri Christensen, and respondent, David Whyte, are
long time employees of the United States Postal Service, becoming acquainted
with each other some fifteen years ago through their employment. Respondent, David Whyte, had been a job supervisor of appellant, Deri Christensen,
at the Postal Service and the two were in daily contact with each other
at their place of employment.
Through their Postal Service acquaintance, appellant, Deri
Christensen, became aware of respondent, David Whyte, doing carpentry
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and home building work, and respondent, David Whyte, became aware of
an addition which appellant, Deri Christensen, wished to make to his
home located in the southwest part of Salt Lake County.
In the summer of 1973, according to the testimony of respondent,
David Whyte, (R-5), or in May of 1973, according to the testimony of
appellant, Deri Christensen (R-125), the respondent and his wife met
with the appellants at the home of the appellants in the Granger area
of Salt Lake County. At this meeting at the home of the appellants, the
addition to appellants1 home was discussed together with the cost of
the addition.
According to the version of respondent, David Whyte, the
appellant, Deri Christensen, requested a rough idea as to the cost of
the home addition, and respondent, David Whyte, mentioned the area of
$6,000.00 (R-7).

The version of appellant, Deri Christensen, was that

the coat of the addition quoted by respondent, David Whyte, was $5,500.00
(R-127).
At the meeting at appellants1 home during which the wife of
respondent, David Whyte, was present, the matter of labor was discussed
(R-9, 10, 128, 129, 130). Both respondent, David Whyte, and appellant,
Deri Christensen, were in agreement that the three sons of respondent,
David Whyte, would be used to h£lp respondent, David Whyte, although
no rate of compensation for the three sons was discussed.

Pay for the

labor of respondent, David Whyte, was understood to be at the rate equal
to his hourly rate of pay at the Salt Lake Post Office, which respondent,
David Whyte, pegged at $7.00 per hour (R-9), but which appellant, Deri
Christensen, denied (R-129).
Respondent, David Whyte, was an experienced home builder with
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some 42 years of building experience (R-42), having built two complete
homes for himself (R-42) and having had extensive building experience
for others (R-43), but he was not a licensed contractor (R-3 and 143).
Appellant, Deri Christensen, had no building experience and
even received instruction from respondent, David Whyte, in obtaining a
building permit for the addition that was to be made to appellants1
home (R-13 9).
The house addition project got underway in September, 1973, and
was concluded in January, 1974 as per the summary of respondent, David
Whyte, outlined in Exhibits P-1 and P-2, which were prepared by respondent, David Whyte, in anticipation of trial (R-51,52 and 54).
In addition to the house addition, some cement and block were
provided to partially construct a garage and some cement ,was provided
to make a floor for a storage shed.
Respondent, David Whyte, contacted all of those in the building
trades who performed specialty services in the remodel of appellants1
home; e.g. the heating man (R-76), the electrician (R-90 and 91), the
plumber (R-103) and the floor covering man (R-159 and 160).
Respondent, David Whyte, selected the materials that went into
the addition to appellants1 home (R-159).
Billing for all materials and services going into the addition
to appellants1 home went to respondent, David Whyte, who presented the
bills to appellant, Deri Christensen, for payment (R-142 and 143).
The first billing of appellant, Deri Christensen, by respondent,
David Whyte, was for the sum of $1,230.75 and included all materials
and labor to September 27, 1973 (Exhibit D-4).

The sum of $1,230.75

-4-
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was paid by appellant, Deri Christensen, to respondent, David Whyte
(R-130 and 131).
The second billing of appellant, Deri Christensen, by respondent,
David Whyte, was for the sum of $1,609.36 and included materials and
labor to November 4, 1973 (Exhibit D-5 and R-132).

The sum of $1,609.36

was paid by appellant, Deri Christensen, to respondent, David Whyte
(R-133).
In December, 1973 appellant, Deri Christensen, paid the sum of
$561.40 to respondent, David Whyte, for materials furnished by Anderson
Lumber Company (R-64).
After the addition to appellants1 home was completed in
January, 1973, respondent, David Whyte, submitted a final bill (Exhibit
D-6, R-118, 134, and 135), in a total amount of $4,001.72* to appellant,
Deri Christensen. Appellant, Deri Christensen, objected to the bill as
being too high and refused to pay.
Appellants, before the filing of respondents1 complaint June 18,
1974, had paid for all materials, labor and services that had been
supplied in constructing the addition to appellants1 home, except for the
billing for the labor of respondents as shown upon Exhibit D-6.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED
DEFENDANTSf (APPELLANTSf ) MOTION FOR
A DIRECTED VERDICT AT THE CLOSE OF
PLAINTIFFS1 (RESPONDENTS1) EVIDENCE.
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Did the evidence show that respondent, David Whyte, was
a contractor who was contracting without a contractor's license?
58-23-1 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides
as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, ... to engage in the
business or act in the capacity of contractor within this
state without having a license therefor as herein provided,
unless such person ••. in this act. Evidence of the
securing of any construction or building permit from a
governmental agency, or the employment of any person on a
construction project, or the offering of any bid to do
the work of a contractor as herein defined, shall be
accepted in any court of the State of Utah as .prima facie
evidence of engaging in the business or acting in the
capacity of a contractor."

(Emphasis added)

Respondent, David Whyte, admittedly did not have a contractor's
license (Pv-3).

If respondent, David Whyte, was a contractor, and not

an employee of appellants as contended by him, then his contract with
appellants for the labor of himself and the other respondents is void
so as to preclude his recovery for said labor. Qlsen v. Reese, 114 Utah
411, 200 P2d 733.
But was respondent, David Whyte, a contractor?
respondent, David Whyte, an employee of appellants?

Or was

58-23-3 (3), Utah

Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, gives the following definition:
"Contractor: Any person, ..., who for a fixed sum, price, fee,
percentage or other compensation other than wages, undertakes with
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another for the construction, alteration, repair, addition to or
improvement of any building, ... any part thereof; provided, that
the term contractor, as used in this act ... and shall include
subcontractor, but shall not include anyone who merely furnishes
materials or supplies without fabricating the same into, or consuming
the same in the performance of the work of the contractors as herein
defined.

The term contractor ... incidental in their nature.ff

In Strieker v. Industrial Commission, 55 Utah 603, 188 P 849, the
terms "employee" and "independent contractor" are defined as follows:
"An employee is one who works for and under the control of another for
hire."

"An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent

employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own
methods and without being subject to the control of his^employer
except as to the result of the work."
In the instant case, it is conceded by respondent, David
Whyte, that appellant, Deri Christensen, had no building experience
(R-56 and 57). The addition to appellants1 home was discussed between
appellant, Deri Christensen, and respondent, David Whyte, as was the
cost of the addition, and respondent, David Whyte, and his wife, made
a trip to appellants' home to get an idea of the addition that appellants
wanted made to their home. It is interesting to note that respondent,
David Whyte, was the person who hired the other respondents; that it
was him who made contact with those providing specialty services
and materials; that he selected the materials to be used; that it was
under his supervision that the materials were fabricated into the
addition to appellants1 home; that all bills to be paid came to him
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and not appellants; that his employer was the United States Postal Service;
that for tax purposes he considered himself Mself employed"; that his work
upon the addition to appellants1 home was at his own convenience; that
cost of the total addition and not just that of labor was discussed with
appellants; and it was him who supplied the tools and the "know-how"
to get the job done.
Respondent, David Whyte, insisted that he and the other
respondents were employees of the appellants working at the respective
hourly rates of $7.00 and $4.00 per hour and that appellants were
aware of the hourly rate of respondents' labor by virtue of billings to
appellants in the substantial form of Exhibits P-l and P-2 (R-51, 52,
53, and 54).

Yet, when respondent, David Whyte, was cross examined

concerning Exhibits P-l and P-2, he admitted that each of these exhibits
came into existence just three weeks before trial (R-51 and 54).
It is submitted that in keeping with the definition of a
contractor as set forth in 58-23-3 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended, and in keeping with the criteria for determining the
distinction between a servant and an independent contractor as set forth
in Cristean vs» Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 451, 196 Pa 2d 502,
the trial court should have determined that respondent, David Whyte,
was a contractor and directed a verdict in favor of appellants.
POINT II
THE DECISION OF THE JURY WAS NOT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE EVIDENCE.

-8-
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Viewing the evidence presented in a light most favorable to
the respondents, is there evidence to sustain the finding of the jury
that respondent, David Whyte, was a mere employee of appellant, Deri
Christensen?
It would seem that the record is clear that appellants made
known to respondent, David Whyte, what was wanted in the way of an
addition to their home and then turned respondent, David Whyte, loose
to obtain the overall result desired by them.
Did not respondent, David Whyte, hire all of those who were
paid for furnishing services or labor to complete the addition to
appellants1 home?
Did not respondent, David Whyte, make the selection as to
where materials were to be purchased and what materials were to be used
in the building of the addition to appellants' home?
Is there any evidence in the record of any bill for payment of
materials, services or labor that did not go first to the respondent,
David Whyte, and which was then passed on by him to appellant, Deri
Christensen?
Was there a preponderance of the evidence that respondents
were hired at a definite hourly rate agreed upon by respondent, David
Whyte, and appellant, Deri Christensen?

Respondent, David Whyte, claimed

that Exhibits P-l and P-2 spelled out the rate of hourly pay that
made respondents the employees of appellants.

But, appellants could

not have been aware of Exhibits P-l and P-2 for the reason they were
admittedly prepared by respondent, David Whyte, in anticipation of
trial (R-51, 52, 53 and 54). The first billing to appellants for
-9-
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labor and materials was presented to appellant, Deri Christensen, by
respondent, David Whyte, in the form of Exhibit D-4 (R-131).

It should

be noted that there was a $100.00 discrepancy in the amount which
respondent, David Whyte, claimed his records showed as a first payment
and the billing to appellants as evidenced by Exhibit D-4. No dispute
existed that respondent, David Whyte, received $1,609.36 the second time
appellants were billed for payment (Exhibit P-l and D-5).

But Exhibit

D-5, prepared in the handwriting of respondent, David Whyte (R-117)
shows a lump sum of $532.00 for labor as opposed to the breakdown of
$488.00 on Exhibit P-l.

It would clearly seem that, in contemplation of

trial, respondent, David Whyte, through Exhibits P-l and P-2, was
attempting to "force" (Emphasis added) entries that would substantiate
his claim to being an employee rather than a contractor in this case.
*

And the final billing by respondent, David Whyte, to appellant, Deri
Christensen, as evidenced by Exhibit D-6, showed a lump sum amount for
the labor of respondents rather than a specific number of hours at a
definite dollar amount.
It would seem to go without saying that the jury did not consider
the evidence in arriving at its decision in that $811.60 was awarded for
materials furnished by respondent, David Whyte; $734.50 was awarded for
hours of labor performed by respondent, David Whyte, but not paid for;
$32 5.50 was awarded for hours of labor performed by respondent, Terry
Whyte, but not paid for; $224.25 was awarded for hours of labor performed
by respondent, Dan E. Whyte, but not paid for; and $55.00 was awarded for
hours of labor performed by respondent, David B. Whyte, but not paid for.
The trial judge, after dismissal of the jury, made a correction of the
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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verdict of the jury which conformed with the judgment finally entered.
POINT III .
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN GIVEN IN THAT IT WAS CONFUSING
TO THE JURY AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE
APPELLANT.
The gist of this case being a question of whether respondent, David
Whyte, was a contractor or an employee and whether appellant, Deri Christensen was an employer of respondent, David Whyte, and there being no
contractor involved in the construction of the addition to appellants1
home, Instruction No. 5 as given by the trial court was framed in such
a way as to be confusing to the jury and prejudicial to the appellants.
It will be noted that each of the four "important 'tests1' (Emphasis
added), with the exception of test number three (3) is couched in the
language nDid the defendant have the right11 (Emphasis added).

Where

the defendant (appellant here), Deri Christensen, was the property owner,
it goes without saying that he did have all of the rights referred to
in Instruction No. 5 from the mere fact that he was in control of the
property where the home addition was being made.

The question would seem •

to be then what actual active part did appellant, Deri Christensen, have
in the construction of the addition to his home as opposed to what his
"right" (Emphasis added) was.
Then, further, Instruction No. 5 does not give the jury any
direction as to determining in what instance in each of the four tests
enumerated the respondent, David Whyte, would be considered to be a
contractor or would be considered to be an employee of the appellant,
Deri Christensen, and in what instance in each of the four tests enumerated
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the appellant, Deri Christensen, TOuld be considered to be the employer
of respondent, David Whyte.
With the possible exception of test three (3) as enumerated in
Instruction No. 5, the jury could not have come to any other determination
than that the appellant, Deri Christensen, was calling the shots in the
construction of the addition to his home, and thus the employer of
respondent, David Whyte, and the responsible party in effecting the
construction of the addition to his home. The language of Instruction No.
5 clearly put appellant, Deri Christensen, in the position of being between
a rock and a hard spot, and a position of prejudice to him.
CONCLUSION
Upon the record of this case and the statutes and authorities
cited herein, it should be determined that respondent, Dayid Whyte, was
not an employee of appellant, Deri Christensen, but that he (respondent,
David Whyte) was hired as a contractor by appellant, Deri Christensen,
to construct the addition to appellants' home, and that because respondent,
David Whyte, had no contractor's license, the respondents are entitled to
no recovery from the appellants. The verdict of the jury should be
reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BLACKHAM AND BOLEY
Don Blackham and Mikel M. Boley
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
3535 South 3200 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119
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